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Abstract
Systemic risks of default contagion in the Russian interbank mar-
ket are investigated. The analysis is based on considering the bow-tie
structure of the weighted oriented graph describing the structure of
the interbank loans. A probabilistic model of interbank contagion ex-
plicitly taking into account the empirical bow-tie structure reflecting
functionality of the corresponding nodes (borrowers, lenders, borrow-
ers and lenders simultaneously), degree distributions and disassorta-
tivity of the interbank network under consideration based on empirical
data is developed. The characteristics of contagion-related systemic
risk calculated with this model are shown to be in agreement with
those of explicit stress tests.
∗Also at ITEP, Moscow
† The material presented does not necessarily reflect the position of the Bank of Russia
on the issues under discussion.
1
The recent financial crisis has brought into the focus of attention systemic
risks related to economic interactions between banks. Such interactions are
most naturally described in terms of a network of their mutual obligations
[1, 2, 3, 4]. The notion of systemic risks refers to various crisis phenomena in-
volving many economic agents having their origin in their interaction, e.g. in
the outstanding interbank loans [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Game-theoretical foundations
for building a quantitative description of financial contagion were discussed
in Refs. [11, 12, 13].
One of the most important types of crisis phenomena taking place on
complex networks are epidemic type cascading processes, see Ref. [14]. In
the particular case of interbank network considered in the present paper
this is a contagion process triggered by the default of some bank possibly
followed by defaulting of some of its neighbors and, finally, to a formation
of a default cluster. The phenomenon of contagion in interbank markets
has drawn a lot of attention in the literature, see e.g. the recent reviews [8,
9]. Foundations of quantitative analysis of contagion spreading in interbank
networks were laid in the paper [15]1, in which the underlying interbank
network was considered as a weighted directed Poissonian random graph
with neither clustering nor degree-degree correlations taken into account.
The focus of [15] was on systemic risk associated with the percolation phase
transition and formation of giant cluster and the related robust-yet-fragile
property of default contagion where a small probability of a catastrophic
event goes together with its huge volume.
The research following [15] was to a large extent aimed at checking the
assumptions on the properties of interbank network made in [15] against
existing data and, if necessary, incorporating the corresponding modifications
into the theoretical formalism describing default propagation. In terms of
network properties the question is thus on degree distributions, degree-degree
correlations and clustering in realistic interbank networks, while theoretically
a central issue is that of an interplay between topological properties of a
network and those of epidemic cascades on it.
Analysis of empirical properties of the Russian interbank network was
made in Refs. [16, 17] for the period of 01.08.2011-03.11.2011 and in Refs. [18,
19] for the period of 10.2004-08.2008. It was found that this network is
characterized by a heavy-tailed degree distribution [16, 17, 18, 19], heavy-
tailed distribution of exposures [18, 19], pronounced disassortative degree-
degree correlations and significant anomalous clustering [16, 17] 2. In [21]
1See also an interesting comment [10].
2Similar results for degree distribution, degree-degree correlations and clustering were
found for the Brasilian interbank market in [20].
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effects of taking into account heavy-tailed nature of degree distributions,
degree-degree correlations and clustering on default contagion propagation in
the framework of [15] were studied, on a feature-by-feature basis, in a Monte-
Carlo simulation. The first Monte-Carlo simulation on interbank network
with realistic topology was performed in [16, 17].
On theory side it is necessary to incorporate the above-mentioned charac-
teristic features of real interbank networks (heavy-tailed degree distributions,
disassortativity and anomalous clustering) into an analytical formalism. The
generating function formalism used in [15] is directly applicable for arbitrary
degree distributions, so the remaining problem is to take into account degree-
degree correlations and clustering. There exists a considerable literature on
the effects of the influence of these features on percolation transition and
epidemic diffusion. Effects of degree-degree correlations on the percolation
transition was studied in [22] for undirected and [23, 24] for directed graphs,
while that of clustering was analyzed in Refs. [27, 28].
The present paper continues investigation of systemic risks at the Russian
interbank market begun in Refs. [16, 17] and focuses on developing a mathe-
matical model of contagion process taking into account all aspects of geom-
etry of interbank network, important features of the balance sheet structure
of participating banks and institutional regulation relevant for providing a
quantitatively correct description of default cascades. We argue that to build
such a description one should take into account empirical default propagation
probability, bow-tie structure, degree distribution and disassortative corre-
lation structure of interbank networks. An interesting feature we observe is
that although the original interbank network is characterized by high cluster-
ing, default clusters are predominantly tree-like. This latter property agrees
with the findings of Refs. [28] and [29]3.
The main objectives of this paper are the development of the above-
described analytical model based on an enlarged set of empirical data on the
Russian interbank market.
The plan of the paper is as follows.
In section 1 we discuss the structure and main characteristics of the Rus-
sian money market and the data used in the analysis. In the section 2 we
analyze empirical characteristics of the deposit market from the network per-
spective including its bow-tie structure, degree distributions and correlations,
clustering and default propagation probabilities. In section 3 we explore the
structure of the default cluster caused by the default of a randomly cho-
sen bank and after that introduce mathematical formalism for systemic risk
representation in chapter 4. Conclusions are presented in section 5.
3We are grateful to C. Borgs for pointing out this reference.
1 Russian money market: empirics and data
description
Russian money market consists of three main segments, the markets of de-
posits, REPO and SWAP.
Operations at the deposits market are uncollateralized: banks bound their
risk in lending money to counterparties by setting limits calculated with the
help of in-house models and taking into account expert opinions. Lending
risks are also regulated by the special requirement of the Bank of Russia
constraining the value of exposure to a counterparty. The uncollaterized
nature of the deposit market makes it the most vulnerable with respect to
trust evaporation during crises when deposit markets can freeze requiring
significant efforts from regulators for their relaunching.
Less risky is the REPO market at which collateral, usually government
and corporate bonds and equities, is required. In operations with money
borrowing the value of different types of collateral includes discounts thus
reducing the corresponding market risk. Credit risk is more often accounted
for in the credit rate. Let us note that while at the beginning of the Russian
crisis in 2008 the REPO market in Russia did collapse, it started functioning
faster than the deposit one4.
The least risky is the SWAP market. Often swap operations are used as
a source of short-term ruble liquidity when in exchange of rubles a lender
gets foreign collateral (most often USD and EUR). SWAP operations were
attractive for Russian banks during the period of systemic liquidity deficit
when banks are permanently in need of liquidity refinancing from central
bank.
We provide comparative statistics for outstanding in different segments of
the Russian money market in Table 1. For deposit market it includes claims
on banks (resident and non-resident) in deals with Russian rubles. For SWAP
market it includes claims on resident and non-resident banks in rubles against
USD and euro as collateral. It is worth saying that the data includes deals
between banks at the OTC market as well as through Central Counterparty
(CCP), the latter option was used in almost 25% of swap deals. The Repo
market data includes claims on banks in rubles. In 2013 the project of REPO
deals through Central Counterparty was launched. The total outstanding on
CCP at the end of 2013 year was 1.5 bln. USD. To highlight the importance
of money market we also provide the total value of assets of the Russian
4The collapse of deposit and REPO market took place after the Lehman Brothers
default. Due to efforts of Bank of Russia and Ministry of Finance the Repo market was
partly retrieved in two weeks whereas the credit risks still remained too high.
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Market \ Year 2011 2012 2013
Deposit 52.6 54.1 55.0
REPO 5.4 6.4 5.2
SWAP 94.5 84.4 101.2
Total assets 1318.9 1609.6 1742.6
Table 1: Volumes of deposit, REPO and SWAP markets and total market of
banking activities in Russia in Bln. USD [30]. Total assets of banking system
are given to compare the volume of money market with that of other banking
activities such as corporate and retail lending, investments in securities, and
others.
banking system. Some information concerning evolution of the outstanding
for different money market segments can be found in the Bank of Russia
”Money market report” [30].
We based our analysis on daily CBRF banking report ”Operations on
currency and money markets” [31] containing information on all type of
transactions carried out on the OTC money market 5. In our analysis we
concentrate on the deposit market and take into account only uncolleter-
alised deals in Russian rubles between residents. Taking into account only
the deals between residents is due to data limitations. We also exclude deals
with Central Bank of Russia and its branches because corresponding ruble
obligations are always met and therefore do not generate any risk.
Analysis of other segments of the interbank market goes beyond the scope
of this paper. For an interesting analysis of the properties of the multilayer
network including REPO, SWAP and deposit interbank markets in Italy see
Ref. [32] where it was found that all segments of interbank market share such
common features as fat-tailed degree distributions, disassortativity and large
values of clustering coefficients. In terms of contagion we would expect that
taking into account other money market segments may significantly influence
the corresponding exposures and amplify the volume of contagion.
The data used in our analysis cover the interval from January 11 2011 till
December 30 2013 and contain information on interbank loans to residents of
185 banks. This data corresponds to roughly 80 % of the total outstanding
and can therefore be considered as representative.
Having information on interbank transaction we transformed it into out-
5A decentralized market, without a central physical location, where market participants
trade with each other through various communication modes such as telephone, email
and proprietary electronic trading systems. An over-the-counter (OTC) market and an
exchange market are the two basic ways of organizing financial markets.
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standing for each bank with respect to all of its counterparties on the daily
basis. Claims and obligations with different maturities were just summed up.
From the credit risk point of view the maturity of the deal is not important
if a counterparty has already defaulted on its obligations. Of relevance is
then only the value of claims on such a counterparty. As our data cover time
interval from January 11 2011 till December 30 2013 we have no information
on loans borrowed before January 11 January and returned afterwards. It is
not important for short term maturity operations but may be important for
large maturities. From Fig.1 showing dynamics of outstanding for deposit
operations we see that deals with maturities 1-7 days constitute a significant
part of the total outstanding. Long term maturity deals form about 30%
of the total outstanding. The number of counterparties having at least one
deal at a given day slightly changes with time sharply declining at the end
of 2013 due to actions Bank of Russia aimed rising banking solvency.
2 Interbank deposit market: structure and
properties
For the purposes of our analysis we view the interbank credit market as
a weighted oriented graph characterized by the weighted adjacency matrix
W = {wij ≥ 0} where link variables wij > 0 correspond to liabilities of
the bank i towards the bank j and are computed by netting the mutual
obligations of both banks on the daily basis so that a directed link i→ j cor-
responds to a credit to i provided by j. For a given node outgoing (out-type)
links correspond therefore to its obligations towards neighboring nodes and
incoming (in-type) ones to claims of the node under consideration towards
neighboring nodes. Let us note that with this choice of notations default
cascades triggered by some initial node propagate along link’s direction.
2.1 Bow-tie decomposition
In describing systemic risks related to network topology of the interbank mar-
ket it is essential to take into account the gross structure of the corresponding
oriented graph represented by its bow-tie decomposition, see e.g. [33]. In the
problem under consideration, following the above-described definition of the
weighted adjacency matrix W , the bow-tie structure separates, on the daily
basis, the nodes (banks) into four groups according to the type of their op-
erations. The Out- and In- components include nodes having only outgoing
and incoming links correspondingly, i.e. include pure borrowers and lenders
respectively. The In-Out- component includes banks having both incoming
6
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Figure 1: Deposit market term structure outstanding
and outgoing links which are therefore both creditors and lenders. We will
show that banks belonging to this component play a crucial role in generating
systemic risks. The last group consists of nodes without links. The bow-tie
structure includes as a particular important case the core-periphery model
with its core belonging to the In-Out- component and periphery to the In-
and Out- ones.
The structural analysis of the data on interbank network shows that most
of the banks having links (60%-70%) belong to the In- component, i.e. act
as pure lenders while only 10%-20% belong to the Out- component and act
as pure borrowers. The number of pure borrowers and lenders displays pro-
nounced seasonality so that the number of the former increases and of the
latter decreases at the beginning of the year. As to the structure of the out-
standing, it is predominantly concentrated in the In-Out- component (60-70%
7
of total outstanding) so that the the corresponding banks have a persistent
tendency of borrowing (lending) within the In-Out- component. Less im-
portant from exposure point of view are the links between the In-Out and
In components (20-35% of total outstanding) and the Out and In-Out ones
(2-20% of total outstanding). The links between the pure borrowers and
pure lenders contain less than 5% of the total outstanding. The In-Out com-
ponent contains a strongly connected one (SCC) with the size varying from
10% to 15% and carrying 40-60% of the total outstanding demonstrating a
significant monopolistic power of several influential actors.
2.2 Quantitative characteristics
In this paragraph we discuss some most important quantitative characteris-
tics of the Russian interbank network such as distributions in the number if
incoming and outgoing links, correlations in the degrees of neighboring nodes
and degree of clustering.
The distributions of in- and out- degrees are plotted in Figs. 2 and 3.
We see that these distributions are fat-tailed6 . This feature is in agreement
with other results on interbank networks in the literature, see e.g. [20] and
references therein.
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Figure 2: Number of borrowers
distribution
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Figure 3: Number of lenders dis-
tribution
An analysis shows, in agreement with the results of [20], that Russian
6The small number of observations in the fat-tailed part of the distributions doesn’t
allow us to test a hypothesis on its power-law nature. According to [25] the sufficient
number of observations is around 1000 while we have only 50-60.
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interbank network is characterized by pronounced negative degree correla-
tions (disassortativity). In oriented graphs one deals with several types of
degree correlations induced by the bow-tie structure of the network. Proba-
bilistic interdependencies of degrees of adjacent nodes are fully characterized
by the set of bivariate distributions PA→B(k, l|m,n), where A,B refer to the
component of the bow-tie decomposition {I, IO,O} denoting In, In-Out and
Out components respectively and the indices k, l and m,n denote the in- and
out-degrees of the adjacent vertices, see Fig. 4 in which P IO→IO(k, l|m,n) is
shown. In section 3 we will see that in order to provide a good description of
Figure 4: Bivariate distribution P IO→IO(k, l|m,n)
the empirical systemic risk characteristics one has to take into account the
probability patterns described by P IO→IO(k, l|m,n), etc.
The interbank network is characterized by significant clustering. This
feature is illustrated in Fig. 5, in which time series for clustering coefficient7
and link probability (defined as the ratio the number of links in network to
the maximal possible number of links in network) are shown. We see that the
graph under consideration is significantly less sparse than the Erdos-Renyi
one fully specified by the link probability for which the clustering coefficient
is simply equal to link probability.
7Here for simplicity we consider the graph under consideration as unoriented.
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3 Systemic credit risk. Empirical analysis
Systemic credit risk is defined as that of cascade default of several banks
triggered by default of one or several banks on its obligations 8. A default is
operationally defined as an event where the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)
defined below in Eq. (1) falls below the minimal threshold defined by the
regulator, the Central Bank of Russian Federation9. The general definition
of CAR reads [34]:
CAR =
K −
5∑
i=1
Pi
5∑
i=1
(Ai − Pi) · RWi +O
, (1)
where K stands for the capital, Ai denotes the i-th group of assets
10, RWi
is the corresponding risk weight and Pi the corresponding provision for non-
8In the present study we restrict our analysis to cascades trigged by the default of a
single bank.
9This is also a legal reason for the Bank of Russia to revoke a license.
10The regulator breaks all assets into 5 types [30].
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performing loans specified by the regulator while O is a collective notation
for other risk variables such as market and operational risks which also used
under CAR calculation. As the present analysis concentrates on risks related
to interbank loans for which the risk weight RWIC is equal to 20%, in what
follows we shall use the following simplified version of Eq. (1):
CAR =
K − PIC
0.2 · (AIC − PIC) + O˜
, (2)
where AIC and PIC denote interbank claims and corresponding regulator
specified provision respectively and O˜ denotes risk variables additional to
those characterizing interbank credit obligations.
After a counterparty defaults on its obligations its lenders, in accordance
with Russian regulatory document on rules for provision forming, have to
form loan loss provision on deals with this counterparty. According to Rus-
sian legislation banks have to establish provisions in accordance with bor-
rower’s quality and quality of debt servicing. In our simulations we will
assume a provision of 100% and take into account only provision for inter-
bank deposit market operations considering the volume of other operations
as fixed.
To assess systemic risk we calculate the size of default cluster triggered
by the bankruptcy of a particular bank. The stress-testing procedure we use
is as follows:
• A default of a particular bank is assumed. All its creditors form provi-
sion on deals with this default counterparty and recalculate their CAR.
• We check whether the new CARs meet regulatory minimum (10% for
deposit taking banks which are allowed to attract deposit from indi-
viduals and 12% for other non-banking activities like depositary, set-
tlement and payment).
• The procedure is repeated for those creditors for which their CARs fall
below the regulatory minimum.
The procedure is repeated for each bank from Out- and In-Out- com-
ponents11. The resulting probability distribution over the size of default
clusters, where size is defined as a number of banks defaulting as a conse-
quence of the default of an initial default node, is shown, on the annual basis,
in Table 2 and Figs. 6 , 7 (in the latter - on the log-linear scale). A first
11It is clear that for the type of contagion under study banks belonging to empty and
In- components do not generate any systemic risk.
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Yr \ Sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
2011 13.9 6.5 3.3 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0
2012 13.2 6.6 4.4 2.6 1.8 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0
2013 14.8 7.3 5.1 3.1 2.1 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Table 2: Probability distributions (in percent) for default cluster sizes in
2011, 2012 and 2013. For convenience the point corresponding to the prob-
ability of zero-sized cluster was removed
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important conclusion that can be drawn from the Table 2 and Figs. (6,7) is
that the distribution over the size of default clusters is approximately expo-
nential. This is a natural consequence of the (approximately) exponential
degree distribution of the nodes belonging to default clusters (not shown),
see e.g. [26].
Another important feature revealed by stress-testing is a higher impor-
tance in terms of generating default cascades and, therefore, systemic risk,
of the banks from In-Out component as compared with those from the Out-
one. In Table 3 we show the percentage of cases in which a default of the
node under consideration triggers a default of another bank for the In-Out-
and In- components (29− 38% and 6− 10% respectively). The contribution
of the In-Out- component is clearly the dominant one so that in what follows
we will neglect the contribution of the Out- component.
From Table 3 we also see that the average stability of banks with respect
to default risks as characterized by the average CAR underwent, between
12
Component \ Year 2011 2012 2013
In-Out 0.29 0.31 0.38
Out 0.06 0.10 0.10
CAR 14.7 13.7 13.5
Table 3: Bow-tie breakup of percentage of cascades and CAR’s for Russian
interbank market in 2011-2013
2011 and 2013, a significant reduction. It is quite clear that lower values of
CAR generate larger systemic risks. Indeed, an analysis in [15] has shown a
dramatic dependence of contagion on capital reserves. A dependence of the
average size of default cluster on CAR (calculated on the monthly basis) is
shown in Fig. 812. From Fig. 8 it is clearly seen that there indeed exist a
pronounced dependence of the magnitude of contagion on the capital reserves
reflected by CAR.
It is quite typical for contagion that its volume grows with increasing
centrality of the source node, see e.g. [14]. In Fig. 9 we plot a dependence of
the average size of the default cluster on the out-degree of the bankrupt node
(i.e. the number of lenders), where for each day and each bank we calculate
the number of lenders and the size of default cluster generated by this bank
at this day and average over all days in a given year. We see that indeed the
volume of contagion increases with increasing out- degree and that for large
out-degrees the dependence in question is distinctly nonlinear so that the
volume of contagion shows a faster than linear growth with the out-degree
of the source node. From Fig. 9 one can also conclude that, following the
above-described reduction in CAR from 2011 to 2013, a volume of contagion
has dramatically grown within this period.
The key question in developing a model for propagation of contagion is
that of topology of default clusters. In our simulation we found out that
default clusters combining vulnerable banks are, with very few exceptions,
tree-like with the maximal length of branches equal to 4. In directed graphs
the simplest nontrivial motifs, triangles, can belong to two types, T1 and T2,
differing by orientation of participating links, see Figs. 10 and 11 correspond-
ingly. Let us consider for definiteness an example shown in Fig 11, where
the starting event is a default of the bank A leading to f critical CAR loss
of B, but leaving C with an admissible CAR of 10.4 % (with the regulatory
12The bottom and top of the box are the first and third quartiles and the band inside
the box is the median. The end of the low whisker is the lowest datum still within 1,5
x interquartile range and the highest datum still within 1,5 x interquartile range of the
upper quartile.”
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Figure 8: Dependence of default cluster size on CAR
minimum set at 10 %). The consequent CAR loss of 0.6 % from the link
B → C does, however lead to the default of C. Our simulations have shown
that, over all the days, the average number of triangles of the type T1 is
0.06 and of the type T2 - 1.2. Both numbers are small as compared to total
number of default clusters per day considered in our simulations. The effec-
tively tree-like structure of the default cluster that allows to neglect motifs
in working out a mathematical model for default cascading. In particular,
under this assumption propagation of vulnerability between the nodes can
happen only along a single link.
The last key ingredient for modelling default propagation is to quantify
vulnerability of a given node with respect to default of at least one of its
neighbors. Vulnerability can most naturally be described as a probabilistic
characteristic of link’s ability to transport contagion from one node to an-
other. We call a link vulnerable if a default of the counterparty may lead
to default of another counterparty through this link. The link vulnerabil-
ity depends on the local geometry of a network. Generically it is defined
14
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Figure 9: Dependence of default cluster size on the number of lenders
as a conditional probability v(r, s|k, l) of default propagation from the node
with in- and out-degrees r, s to the node with in- and out- degrees k, l. In
addition vulnerability depends on the position of the two nodes under con-
sideration within the bow-tie structure of the network so that probabilistic
pattern of contagion propagation is specified by the conditional probabilities
vIO→IO(r, s|k, l), vIO→In(r, s|k, l) and their more complex modifications. The
corresponding empirical vulnerability distributions are found to differ a lot,
see Refs [16, 9].
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Figure 10: Motifs of length 3 in de-
fault cluster, type T1 Figure 11: Motifs of length 3 in de-
fault cluster, type T2
4 Systemic credit risk. Mathematical model-
ing
The mathematical model we use to describe systemic risks on the Russian
interbank market is based on empirical findings described above in the Sec-
tions 2, 3. Let us reiterate the main features of importance for description
of contagion process:
• Degree distributions are fat-tailed.
• The network is characterized by significant disassortative correlations
between adjacent nodes.
• Because of significant differences in systemic risks related to the posi-
tion of the infected node and its neighbors within the bow-tie structure
it is natural to take this into account explicitly when building the math-
ematical formalism13.
• Default clusters are tree-like.
Let us consider a bank from the In-Out component with k + l outgoing
links, where k of them lead to the In-Out- component and l to In- component
13Although the mathematical construction built in the present paper is quite natural
and is versatile enough to describe the empirical simulations of systemic risk, the question
of whether it can be simplified further is relevant and deserves further investigation. An
interesting example of solving the problem of this kind can be found in Ref. [37].
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respectively14 and take a randomly chosen edge linking the chosen node to
a node in the In- component which, in addition, has r − 1 incoming links,
see Fig. 12 a. This is a simplest case where contagion goes from the In-Out-
component to the In-one and stops there.
a)
b)
Figure 12: Default spreading mechanism. The individual diagrams depict
corresponding probabilities, see e.g. similar notation in [15].
Conditional probability distribution for reaching a vulnerable bank from
the In- component following a link from the In-Out- one is described by the
generation function Nk,l(y)
Nk,l(y) =
∞∑
r
P IO→In(r|k, l)
(
1− vIO→In(r|k, l) + y vIO→In(r|k, l)
)
(3)
where we have taken into account that an outgoing link under considera-
tion can lead to a vulnerable bank with probability vIO→In(r|k, l) or safe
one with probability 1 − vIO→In(r|k, l) and, through the conditional prob-
ability P IO→In(r|k, l), the probabilistic interdependence of the degrees of
14As discussed above, nodes from the Out- component generate very small systemic
risks so that the corresponding effects will be neglected
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nodes connected by this link. The corresponding part of the default clus-
ter can therefore described as a projection of the initial network onto a
graph in which a link in the original graph survives with the probability
P IO→In(r|k, l) vIO→In(r|k, l).
Let us now consider a randomly chosen edge linking two banks from
the In-Out- component, see Fig. 12 b. The equation for the corresponding
generating function Mk,l(x, y) reads
15:
Mk,l(x, y) =
∞∑
u,t,r
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)(1− vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l))+
x
∞∑
u,t,r
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)[Mu,t(x, y)]
u[Nu,t(y)]
t
(4)
The corresponding part of the default cluster can be described as a projection
of the initial network onto a graph in which a link in the original graph
survives with the probability P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l) vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l).
Let us define a generation function F (x, y) =
∞∑
k,l
P IO(k, l)xkyl for the
probability for a bank from the In-Out- component to have k and l first
neighbors from the In-Out- and In- components respectively. Then the gen-
eration function for the number of vulnerable banks in the network is simply
F ({Mkl(x, y)}, {Nkl(y)}) ≡ F (M,N) =
∞∑
k,l
P IO(k, l) [Mkl(x, y)]
k [Nkl(y)]
l
(5)
It is easy to see that for calculation of the mean default cluster size S one
can put y = x and compute a derivative of F (M,N) at point x = 1. We
have
Sdx = dF (M,N)y=x=1 =
∞∑
k,l
P IO(k, l)(kdMk,l|x=1 + ldNk,l|x=1), (6)
where we have used the normalization property of generation functions
Mk,l|x=1 = Nk,l|x=1 = 1. From Eq. (3) we get
dNk,l|x=1 =
∞∑
r
P IO→In(r|k, l)vIO→In(r|k, l)dx, (7)
so that
dMk,l =
∞∑
u,t
αu,t,k,ldMu,t + γk,ldx (8)
15The notations for the indices should be clear from Fig. 12 b.
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where
αu,t,k,l =
∞∑
r
uP IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l) (9)
γk,l =
∞∑
u,t,r
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)
+
∞∑
u,t,r
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)
× t
∞∑
r1
P IO→In(r1|u, t)v
IO→In(r1|u, t) (10)
It is useful to rewrite Eq. (8) in the operator form:
dM = AdM + γdx, (11)
where dM and γ are vectors of length k × l and A is a k × l, k × l matrix
size with the elements A(k,l)(u,t) = αu,t,k,l. For solution of Eq.(11) to exist its
maximal eigenvalue λmax should satisfy λmax < 1
16. It reads:
dMk,l =
∞∑
u,t
βk,l,u,tγu,tdx (12)
where βu,t,k,l is an element B(u,t),(k,l) of the matrix B = (I − A)
−1. Equa-
tion (12) is valid in the absence of a giant cluster and should be modified in
the percolative phase, see e.g. [35, 36].
The final equation for the average default cluster size S following from
Eqs. (6,7,8,11) reads
S =
dF
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
∞∑
k,l
P IO(k, l)
[
k
∞∑
u,t
βk,l,u,tγu,t + l
∞∑
r
ωk,l,r
]
, (13)
where
ωk,l,r = P
IO→In(r|k, l)υIO→In(r|k, l). (14)
To calculate the average size of the default cluster we use empirical condi-
tional probability distributions P IO→In(r|k, l), vIO→In(r|k, l), P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)
16In [9] it is shown that a more restrictive condition valid in the non-percolative regime
reads
∞∑
u,t
A(k,l)(u,t) < 1 for all pairs (k, l).
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and vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l) that are calculated on the monthly basis. A compar-
ison of the model predictions and results of stress testing for the average
default cluster size is shown in Fig.13. We see a very good agreement be-
tween the model and experiment provided one takes into account correla-
tions between the degrees of adjacent nodes captured by P IO→In(r|k, l) and
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l) and a much poorer one when these correlations are ne-
glected. The remaining deviations can be ascribed to using analytical ap-
proximation appropriate to infinite graphs17 Another source of deviation is
in neglecting triangles in default graph.
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Figure 13: Comparison of theoretical and empirical average default cluster
size with and without accounting for degree-degree correlations
17As shown in section 3 the maximal number of branchings in default trees is 4.
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5 Conclusions
Let us formulate once again the main conclusions of the paper.
In this study we have described a new analytical model of default con-
tagion propagation taking into account the difference in the functional role
of the nodes (bow-tie decomposition), realistic in- and out- degree and link
weight distributions and disassortative degree-degree correlations. Its pre-
dictions are shown to be in line with the results of Monte-Carlo simulations.
Let us reiterate, that to build a successful model of contagion propagation
in interbank networks one needs to combine empirical studies and adequate
theoretical framework. Empirical information of importance is related both
to topological characteristics of the interbank market network under con-
sideration and to the process of contagion propagation from node to node
that depends, in particular, on interplay between link and node character-
istics (volume of loans and bank balance sheets respectively). It was shown
that very good description of default cascade simulation can be given in the
formalism that explicitly takes into account degree distributions and degree-
degree correlations and conditional probabilities of contagion propagation
from one node to another. Let us mention that although a marked difference
in conditional default probabilities for nodes belonging to different compo-
nents and empirical simulation results highlighting the dominant role of the
in-out component provide strong arguments for explicit account of the bow-
tie structure in describing systemic contagion risks, a more detailed analysis
of this issue (in particular going beyond considering the mean size of default
clusters) is certainly desirable. We are planning to address this problem
in a separate publication. The results obtained in this paper can be used
for estimating systemic risks in interbank networks as well as for analyzing
sensitivity of systemic risk with respect to changes in network topology and
stability of individual banks. The results can also be used for the analy-
sis of liquidity risks – with the contagion propagation through in-links and
modification of vulnerability criterion.
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